Political mechanics of smallness: The Baltic states as small states in the European Parliament by Sikk, A & Cianetti, L
 1 
 
Political mechanics of smallness: The Baltic States as small states in the 
European Parliament 
Allan Sikk & Licia Cianetti 
University College London, School of Slavonic and East European Studies 
 
The impact of state size on macroeconomics, political economy and international politics is 
well established in academic literature. When it comes to domestic politics, the received 
wisdom is that nearly all contemporary democracies are too big to benefit from advantages 
assigned to small political communities, following the conclusion from Dahl & Tufte’s seminal 
Size & Democracy (1973). However, there is evidence on the impact of country size on the 
size of parliaments, democratic endurance, civil conflict, electoral turnout and party 
membership levels.1 Still, much of the research is exploratory in nature and the mechanisms 
by which state size affects political variables remain understudied. 
 
Anckar (2002) is among the few to break the mould as he argues that smaller country size 
means smaller distances between elites and citizens and, as a result, interest articulation is 
filtered through fewer intervening structures and agents. This chapter analyses the working 
of such intermediate institutions in the Baltic states. More specifically, we look at the 
members of European Parliament (MEPs) by analysing patterns of representation in the 
committees and political groups of the European parliament and on national party boards. 
Small country size in conjunction with party system fragmentation has led to MEPs being 
scattered among the organs of the European Parliament (EP) and to their negligible 
representation on party boards. This can both reduce the influence of the Baltic states within 
the EP, but also the influence of MEPs within their parties and, by implication, reduce the EU-
related policy expertise and the even the overall importance of political relevance of the EU 
in domestic politics. 
 
At the same time, we discover that the MEPs from the Baltic states are politically more 
experienced than MEPs from larger countries, despite their arguably more marginal position. 
We find that in general country size is negatively correlated with national political experience 
of MEPs, so that the levels of experience are higher in smaller member states, and particularly 
in new member states – such as the Baltic states. We propose a theoretical model for the 
relationship and also discuss additional factors (shorter length of political career paths and 
attractiveness of MEP status) that can further strengthen the relationship in the Baltic states. 
 
                                                     
1 See on size and parliaments: Taagepera & Shugart 1989, Taagepera & Recchia 2002, Taagepera 2007; small 
size conducive to democracy: Srebrnik 2004, Ott 2000; large size conductive to democracy: Erk & Veenendaal 
2014, Gerring & Zarecki 2011, Clague, Gleason, and Knack 2001; civil conflict: Brückner 2010, Collier & Hoeffler 
2009, Fearon & Laitin 2003, Hegre & Sambanis 2006; turnout: Geys 2006: 642-3, Blais 2000, p.59; party 
membership: Weldon 2006. 
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This higher level of national parliamentary and cabinet experience may compensate both for 
the small numbers of representatives in the EP and the small number of MEPs on party 
boards. Particularly those MEPs who have served in national cabinets have, as ministers, 
interacted with the national parliaments and the EU (both the European Commission and the 
EU ministerial level meetings). Hence, such MEPs and, by implication, their countries and 
national parties are ceteris paribus at an advantage when it comes to using argumentative 
and lobbying strategies (see Panke, this volume) in asserting influence in the European 
Parliament. 
Baltic states and the political impact of size 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are often included in studies on European small states and have 
also been the subject of many case studies focussing on the political and economic effects of 
country size. Interest in the small Baltic states intensified after their accession to the EU and 
NATO and in the wake of the Great Recession that hit them particularly hard. While the small 
size of these countries has often been used as an explanatory or intervening variable, the 
specific mechanisms through which size affects politics – especially domestic politics – are 
relatively uncharted. 
Most studies that include the Baltic states have concerned political economy or foreign policy 
– including studies of all European small states and those that focus specifically on one or 
more Baltic states (most frequently Estonia). Although they define smallness in various ways, 
they generally tend to assume that it leads to vulnerability and limitations and look at their 
economic, political or defence implications. Studies on foreign politics have focussed 
particularly on international security and negotiations in the EU. In international and security 
studies, size is typically related to a country’s capacity to project power and defend itself. 
These studies argue that we need to take small size into account in order to understand Baltic 
foreign policy, especially as it entails specific vulnerabilities and limits international 
capabilities (Trapans 1998; Männik 2004) and influence on agenda-setting in international 
organisations (Galbreath and Lamoreaux 2007; Lamoreaux and Galbreath 2008; Archer 2010; 
Crandall 2014). The effects of smallness are often intermingled with effects of other factors, 
such as proximity to Russia (Archer 2010), membership in regional organisations (Männik 
2004; Lamoreaux and Galbreath 2008), or international political economy (Kattel et al. 2010). 
As a consequence, country size is often seen as an important, but fuzzy background condition. 
Some of the same themes surface in studies on negotiating strategies in the EU. Especially 
after the 2004 enlargement, size differences in the EU and their implications for decision-
making practices have attracted academic attention. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are typically 
included in comparative studies of European small states (Bunse et al. 2005; Thorhallsson 
2006; Panke 2010, 2012, this volume; Steinmetz and Wivel 2010). Like the literature on 
foreign policy and security, studies of EU decision-making assume that smallness limits the 
negotiating strategies of small states. Opportunities and possible ways to overcome those 
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limitations are also highlighted; for example, Diana Panke looks at how small EU states can 
under certain conditions ‘punch above their weight’ in EU negotiations (Panke 2010, 2012).  
These studies provide useful insights into small states’ negotiating capabilities and strategic 
possibilities within the EU. Smallness is seen as an important constraining factor, but the 
mechanisms through which small size actually affects the political process are often not 
considered in detail. One exception is a study commissioned by the EU Affairs Committee of 
the Estonian Parliament, which focuses specifically on Estonia’s officials and their strategies 
vis-à-vis EU institutions (Made 2010). Made posits small size as one of the main factors in 
Estonia’s EU-policies, in terms of limited resources, perception of the country’s own potential, 
and strategic constraints. Through his close focus on Estonian officials, he provides useful 
insights on the differences between Tallinn-based and Brussels-based officials, their 
perceptions of country size and influence, and their strategies for dealing with size-related 
limitations. He argues the small number of EU policy experts can result in high workload and 
multitasking, which can affect the quality of decision-making.2  
The analysis of Estonian party politics after EU accession by one of the authors of this chapter 
is another attempt at uncovering the mechanics behind the influence of size (Sikk 2009a). The 
effects of EU membership on party politics were found to be mediated by the small size of the 
country. The small number of European policy specialists and of MEPs means that they have 
limited presence in the decision-making bodies of political parties, which can contribute to 
the side-lining of European issues in favour of domestic concerns. However, a broader 
comparative framework is necessary for clearly identifying the specific effects of smallness 
beyond the case of Estonia. 
In this chapter, we focus on the effects of country size on EU politics by looking at the numbers 
and role of MEPs from the Baltic states. MEPs are arguably the most prominent European 
specialists – party politically speaking – and a crucial link between (national) political parties 
and European politics. Through a comparative analysis and theory building on the impact of 
size on the numbers, distribution, status and background of MEPs, this chapter complements 
findings from other studies to uncover some of the elementary mechanisms through which 
size matters. Our theoretical arguments and those stemming from the quantitative 
comparative analysis are complemented and tested by in-depth look at the MEPs from the 
Baltic states. For the most part, we use size as a continuous rather than a dichotomous 
variable as that allows us to develop more general theoretical models and alleviates the need 
to come up with (potentially arbitrary) cut-off points. We look at the Baltic states as countries 
at the extreme low end of the scale and use the specific detail to illustrate the general effect 
of size. 
                                                     
2 Still, given the study’s aim to provide policy recommendations, it does not clearly distinguish between effects 
related to size and other factors (such as the short period of EU membership). 
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We show that even though small countries are overrepresented in the EP relative to their size, 
the small absolute number of MEPs has implications on both coverage of issue areas in the 
EP and their involvement within party organs. However, country size also has an effect on the 
level of national political experience of MEPs. MEPs from small member states tend to have 
more experience in national politics than those from larger member states. This can imply 
stronger linkages to national politics and can compensate for the small numbers in terms of 
the quality of representation.3  We also propose an underlying theoretical model for the 
relationship between size of representation and national political experience and finish with 
a discussion of intervening and additional factors, some of which can independently linked to 
country size. 
Country size and representative institutions 
The size of national delegations in EP is linked to country size by the principle of “degressive 
proportionality” where some of the specifics have been influenced by historical bargaining 
(see Corbett et al. 2011: 27-29) (see Figure 1). The average ratio is three MEPs per million 
people, but it is much more favourable for smaller member states than large member states. 
Hence, there are 4.5 MEPs for one million Estonians, yet only 1.2 per million Germans; 
Luxembourg and Malta have the most favourable ration of about 12 MEPs per million. 
Taagepera & Hosli (2006) develop a logical model linking the size of country’s population and 






where Si is the number of seats for country i, S stands for the total number of seats available, 















where N is the number of member states, S the total number of seats and P total population 
(of the EU). The line based on the logical model on Figure 1 fits the line well (close to the 
empirical linear OLS fit, not shown), but the two smallest member states as well as Germany 
(the biggest member state) are clearly overrepresented.4  
                                                     
3 Possibly, it also alleviates disconnect that may result from a physical distance between Brussels and national 
capitals. 
4 The reasons why Germany is overrepresented are discussed in some detail in Corbett et al (2011: 27-29). Malta 
and Luxembourg benefit from a legally stipulated minimum number of seats per member state – according to 
the Taagepera & Hosli model, their delegations would include three and four MEPs, respectively. Please note 
that the seat distribution refers to pre-Lisbon Treaty allocation as data from Corbett et al. (2011) used later in 
the chapter refers to that period. Post-Lisbon Treaty seat allocation would fit the Taagepera & Hosli model even 
better as the total number of seats increased while the numbers of German and Maltese MEPs were reduced. 
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Figure 1 Country size and number of MEPs 
 
A similar relationship holds for the number of seats in national parliaments. For an obvious 
reason it is less strong than that between the country size and EP delegation – the size of 
national parliaments has been decided independently by individual countries. As argued by 
Rein Taagepera and his colleagues, the total number of seats in national assembly 
approximately follows the cube root of total population. They argue that the cube root 
formula minimizes the workload of representatives by optimizing the number of 
communication channels between representatives and constituents and representatives 
themselves (see Taagepera & Shugart 1989, p.175; Taagepera 2007: Ch.12). The size of 
national parliaments in EU member states follows the cube root function very closely, with 
parliaments in larger member states being slightly “oversize” and those in smaller member 
states slightly “undersize” (see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2 Country size and size of parliament (lower houses) 
 




Finally, cabinet size is also related to country size. It is positively, albeit weakly, linked to total 
population (R2=0.26), with relatively smaller cabinets in post-communist countries, 
controlling for country size (see the lower empirical OLS fit line on Figure 3). However, there 
are many outliers – such as Hungary, Malta and the Netherlands with undersized and Sweden 
and Finland with oversized cabinets. The reasons why larger countries tend to have larger 
cabinets are not immediate clear and remain beyond the scope of this chapter. At this point, 
we can only speculate that it may be related to more limited resources, a smaller number of 
significant issue areas in smaller countries; the variation also partly stems from different 
institutional arrangements and notions of what constitutes a cabinet. 
 
Figure 3 Country size and cabinet size 
 
Source: Number of cabinet members from Andersson et al. (2014). 
European Parliament party groups and committees 
Small country MEPs can sometimes punch above their weight and yield disproportional 
influence in the Parliament. Regardless of their background and even the size of delegations, 
MEPs form small countries can enjoy more power by being kingmakers. One specific example 
is the establishment of party groups. A party group needs to have at least 25 representatives 
from at least a quarter of member states (Corbett et al. 2011, p.78). Baltic MEPs have been 
highly sought-after at times in recent years. For example, the Europe of Freedom and Direct 
Democracy (EFDD) group led by United Kingdom Independence party (UKIP) and the Italian 
Five Star Movement disintegrated on 14 October 2014 when a Latvian MEP (Iveta Grigule of 
the Union of Greens and Farmers) decided to leave the group but was soon reinstituted when 
an MEP from the Polish Congress of the New Right (Robert Iwaszkiewicz)5 decided to join. In 
                                                     
5  See “Farage’s Eurosceptic Group Collapses, Sakharov Prize Winner Postponed.” EurActiv, 
http://www.euractiv.com/video/farages-eurosceptic-group-collapses-sakharov-prize-winner-postponed-
309257 16 October 2014 and “Farage’s Eurosceptic Group Saved by Polish MEP.” EurActiv, 21 October 2014. 
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2009, the establishment of European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group hinged upon 
recruiting members from a sufficiently large number of member states. Out of this necessity, 
ECR joined forces with a nationalist Latvian party (TB-LNNK) with just one MEP amongst other, 
often controversial – parties from Central and Eastern Europe (Bale et al 2010).6 In the same 
year, Indrek Tarand, an anti-party independent candidate, was successful in his bid to become 
an MEP for Estonia. Before eventually joining the Greens–European Free Alliance (Greens-
EFA) group, he was courted by no less than four other groups – the Alliance of Liberals and 
Democrats for Europe (ALDE), the Party of European Socialists (PES), ECR and the group of the 
non-attached (Sikk 2009b; Ehin and Solvak 2012).7  
 
EP committees have been growing in importance as the significance of EP itself has grown. It 
has been shown that committee members possess high levels of expertise on the policy areas 
of the committees (McElroy 2006)(McElroy 2006). Due to the high number of committees (20 
as of 2014-15), only bigger member states can have representatives in all committees.8 The 
Baltic states are very far from that, given their very small number of MEPs. One strategy of 
overcoming the problem of small size could be cooperation. Between them, the Baltic states 
have 24 MEPs and if the choice of committees were carefully coordinated, they might just be 
able to cover all the committees between them.Such coordination is only hypothetical 
because of partisan divides and at best limited sense of common identity. Toomas-Hendrik 
Ilves, the most popular candidate in 2004 European elections in Estonia (former foreign 
minister and later the country’s president) made his views on ‘Baltic unity’ clear in a 1999 
speech entitled ‘Estonia as a Nordic country’: ‘… it is time to do away with poorly fitting, 
externally imposed categories. It is time that we recognise that we are dealing with three very 
different countries in the Baltic area, with completely different affinities.’ (cited in Lehti 2006, 
p.71). 
 
In practice, there is little evidence of coordination across national delegations. Indeed, even 
coordination amongst Baltic representatives belonging to the same EP group can be difficult 
if they come from parties that are adversaries in national politics. The Baltic delegations in 
the ALDE group are particularly notorious in that regard. Its Lithuanian members belong to 
the Labour Party (centrist, often characterized as populist and marred by corruption scandals) 
and the Liberal Movement (the most economically and socially liberal Lithuanian party). Both 
have at times been included in the governing coalitions, but always avoided each other. The 
Estonian members of the EP group belong to the free marketeer Reform party and the centre-
                                                     
http://www.euractiv.com/video/farages-eurosceptic-group-saved-polish-mep-309367 (accessed 15 January 
2015). 
6 ECR only narrowly met the requirement to include MEPs from at least seven member states. 
7  Also see “Nädala Tegija”, Radio Kuku, 10 July 2009 (in Estonian, 
http://podcast.kuku.ee/2009/07/10/nadalategija-2009-07-10/, accessed 12 January 2015) where Tarand 
discussed his negotiations with various groups openly and in rich detail. 
8 Substitute members have few disadvantages over full members (Corbett et al. 2011, p.146) and we look at 
them in the following discussion. 
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left Centre party (with a controversial dominant leader and a particular stronghold amongst 
the Russian speaking minority) that have in recent decades been foes in Estonian party 
politics. Even stranger bedfellows can be found when looking at MEPs from all three Baltic 
states together. The Greens–EFA have three members from the Baltic states: Bronis Ropė 
(Lithuania), Tatjana Ždanoka (Latvia) and Indrek Tarand (Estonia). Ropė is the vice-chair of the 
agrarian and Eurosceptic Lithuanian Peasant and Greens Union. Tatjana Ždanoka is a co-chair 
of hard-line Russian Union and was once barred from running to the national parliament 
because of continued membership in the Communist Party after it had called for a coup 
against the democratically elected pro-independence government in 1991. Yet, Indrek Tarand 
(an independent) used to be the Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during 
the EU membership negotiations and is also known for his fervent anti-communism – 
infamously for a controversial public prank against former communist top politicians in 
Estonia.9 
 
Therefore, because of the combined effect of small numbers of MEPs and lack of coordination 
between them, two committees (Development and Constitutional Affairs) were without any 
Baltic representatives – even when including substitute members.10 Further three (Economic 
and Monetary Affairs, Fisheries and Legal Affairs) only included substitute members from the 
Baltic states. In addition to coordination problems, a key reasons for the uneven distribution 
of MEPs in committees is the popularity of some committees.  
 
The Foreign Affairs Committee, in particular, has for long been the committee of choice for 
Baltic MEPs as it included five full members from the Baltic states – with three from Latvia 
alone. Together with the substitutes, seven Baltic MEPs were involved in the work of the 
committee – nearly a third of all Baltic MEPs. The situation has been similar since at least 2008 
(see Sikk 2009a) when the Foreign Affairs Committee included as many as nine members (four 
members and five substitutes). In 2008, the Security and Defence sub-committee was 
particularly popular among Baltic MEPs – it also had vice-chairs from Latvia and Lithuania.11 
In 2015, the committee on Industry, Research and Energy was also popular with five full 
members and one substitute.  
 
The concentration on some committees (and absence from others) may be a sign that Baltic 
MEPs chose to focus on issue areas more significant to them and their constituents, hoping 
to make a difference there. This corresponds to the strategy of prioritization in the European 
Commission discussed by Diana Panke in her chapter in this volume. The focus on Foreign 
Affairs is expected as the membership in the EU was to great extent seen as a foreign policy 
                                                     
9 See Sikk 2009b, p.4. 
10 The data here and below refer to the situation as of January 2015. 
11  In 2008 the distribution was generally more even as there was at least one Baltic representative in all 
committees (three with substitute members only). However, the total number of Baltic MEPs has decreased by 
three since then.  
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project and part of the grand turning back on communist history by ‘returning to the West’ 
(see Tulmets 2014). High membership in Industry, Research and Energy are explained by the 
relevance of EU energy policy for all states, but for Lithuania in particular. Following the EU 
accession the country had to close its nuclear power station in Ignalina (Ivanov 2008) and the 
future of sustainable electricity production has since been a pre-occupation for the country. 
Typically, three Lithuanian MEPs (27 percent of the national delegation) have been sitting on 
the committee as full or substitute members. 
 
 The size of individual party delegations from the Baltic states is further affected by the 
fragmentation of party systems. The average size of a party delegation in EP is four – even 
theoretically far beyond the reach for almost all Baltic parties. Indeed, Estonia has the lowest 
average size of party delegations (1.2). Note that Italy has the highest average party 
delegation (10.3) despite a fairly fragmented party system – that shows how much more 
difficult it is for parties from small member states – even with lower fragmentation – to have 
anything but a niche presence in EP. In 2014, 16 parties from the Baltic states – four from 
Estonia, five from Latvia and seven from Lithuania – entered the EP, ten of them with only 
one representative.  Only Unity from Latvia managed to send a “delegation” in a meaningful 
sense of the word by winning four seats. However, this is generally highly unlikely, given the 
multi-party systems and proportional electoral systems in the Baltic states.  
 
 
MEPs and national party organs 
Due to the small overall number of Baltic MEPs and rather fragmented party systems, the 
representation of MEPs on party boards is very low.  As of 2015 Unity (V) in Latvia is an 
exception as three out of its four MEPs are members of the party board – a respectable fifth 
of all members. 12  However, that was only made possible by the surprisingly strong 
performance by the party in the 2014 European elections; its support more than halved in 
parliamentary elections only five months later. No other Baltic party has as many MEPs, the 
maximum among all others being two – limited to four Lithuanian parties and one Estonian 
party. Hence, numerically speaking, the MEPs are bound to remain a tiny minority on party 
boards. 
 
When looking at Baltic MEPs from the perspective of national delegations in the Parliament, 
their profile within their (national) parties has generally been high. Typically, more than half 
of them have either been party board members or in an even more senior position. Hence, in 
January 2015, 16 out of 25 Baltic MEPs (64%) had been elected to their party boards and 
seven (28%) of them were either vice-chairs or leaders of their parties – the Lithuanian MEPs 
                                                     




Rolandas Paksas (Order and Justice) and Valdemar Tomaševski (Electoral Action of Poles). 
Another Lithuanian MEP – Viktor Uspaskich – is the honorary chairman of the Labour Party 
that he set up in 2003, but he stood down from leadership in 2013 after he was found guilty 
of fraudulent bookkeeping. Two other MEPs from Estonia (Marju Lauristin) and Lithuania 
(Algirdas Saudargas) are former ministers and very eminent politicians highly respected by 
their parties.  
 
The MEPs who do not have leadership positions in their parties are mostly people who do not 
have prominent party political careers behind them and owe their success to other factors. 
These include an independent (Tarand, see above), a well-known former professional poker 
player (Antanas Guoga from Lithuania), and a 33-year-old grandson of Vytautas Landsbergis, 
one of the most eminent Lithuanian post-independence politicians (Gabrielius Landsbergis). 
Two of the Latvian MEPs benefitted from the open list system (used in all three Baltic states) 
and high number of personal preference votes. Andrejs Mamikins (prominent journalist) and 
Iveta Grigule (ran an expensive personal campaign funded by unnamed benefactors) became 
successful despite their relatively low standing on their parties’ candidate lists (fourth and 
third, respectively) . Grigule had been a member of national parliament since 2010, but had 
left the Green Party after irregularities in her campaign funding that had financial 
consequences for the party; she joined the Latvian Farmer’s Union (the second party in the 
electoral coalition) in the run-up to the European elections. 
Country size and national political experience of MEPs 
The previous section painted a rather bleak picture of atomized small country MEPs who can 
cover only a limited number issue areas – even between all MEPs from the three Baltic states 
– and whose voice is weak in national party organs. However, these limitations can partly be 
compensated by their national political experience – that can, in turn, also be a function of 
small size. 
 
The Baltic MEPs have among the highest levels of previous experience in national parliament 
and cabinet amongst all EU member states. In 2009, nearly a third of MEPs (31%) had been 
former PMs or presidents (see Figure 4).13 Overall, small and post-communist countries seem 
to have higher levels of experience – Slovakia and Slovenia are close to the Baltic states and 
nearly all post-communist countries have a higher than average score on both of the indexes.  
 
                                                     
13 After 2014 elections the share of MEPs from the Baltic states with ministerial experience dropped to levels 
common in countries of similar sizes; the share of Latvian MEPs with parliamentary experience dropped 
somewhat from the extremely high level. Note, however, that due to the small number of MEPs from these 
countries, a change in the background of just one MEP can change the percentages considerably. 
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Figure 4 MEPs with national parliamentary and ministerial experience by member states 
 
Source: based on Corbett et al. 2011, pp.56–58. 
Note: vertical lines indicate average parliamentary (solid) and ministerial (dashed) experience.  
 
It is obvious from Figure 4 that MEPs from smaller member states tend to have more 
experience in national politics. We study the relationship in more detail below, but first 
propose a very basic theoretical model to outline our expectations. In short, we argue that 
political elites tend to be more concentrated in smaller countries and the effect is not only 
due to smaller population but mediated by the effect that size has on intermediate 
institutions – specifically, the size of EP delegation, the size of national parliament and cabinet 
size.  
A theoretical model 
Before looking at the empirical relationship between relationship between country size and 
MEPs’ experience in national parliaments, it might be useful to discuss our theoretical 
expectations. That can be done by logical models as proposed by Taagepera (2008). We can 
argue that the relationship is anchored at 100% for a (hypothetical) single MEP (for a 
discussion on anchor points, see Taagepera 2008, p.98). If there was a tiny member state that 
only had a single MEP, it would be extremely likely to be someone who has also had a chance 
to serve in the national parliament. On one hand, such prominent national politicians would 
have an electoral advantage and, on the other hand, such a candidate must have been a 
political ‘talent’ who would have been an MP at some point in her career.  
 
An anchor point is much more difficult to establish at the other end of the scale. We can 
expect the share of former MPs to decrease with increasing size of the national delegation in 
EP. Some MPs can choose not to continue their careers in the European Parliament. For the 
sake of argument, let us consider a national parliament in a hypothetical huge country with 
500 MEPs – roughly what a country the size of China would get under the current formula. If 
the parliament of that massive country followed the cube root law (see above and Taagepera 
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2007, pp.188–9), it would have around 1,000 members. Hence, the EP delegation would come 
to challenge the national parliament in terms of its size. Consequently, it would be likely that 
many MPs would not aim to become MEPs and others will be building up their careers 
focussed on the European rather than national parliament as there are almost equal amount 
of opportunities. 
 
It is difficult to suggest an exact shape for the function. We can only speculate that it 
decreases constantly as the number of MEPs multiplies (hence the use of logarithmic scale 
below) and establish the rate of change empirically. When fitting a constrained regression 
(that forces the best fit line to go through the anchor point), 0% is reached at about 300 MEPs 
(see Figure 5).14  
 
Figure 5 shows that there is a broad negative relationship between the number of MEPs and 
their experience in national parliaments, and by extension between the country size and 
experience. Overall, the number of MEPs (logged) explains 36% of the variation in their 
parliamentary experience, the percentage predicted by ordinary least squares regression 
decreasing from 70% (for countries with 5 MEPs) to only 22% (for countries with 95 MEPs). 
However, there is a fair amount of scatter around the statistically modelled relationship – 
much of it is explained by the history of member states. On average, the parliamentary 
experience of MEPs from the formerly communist member states is some 23% percentage 
points higher compared to West European (not formerly communist) member states, when 
controlling for the effect of country size – indicated by the raised linear fit line for post-
communist countries in Figure 5. 
 
Some of the outliers may be explained by very small national parliaments relative to the 
population (for example the Netherlands, see Figure 2). Interestingly, nearly all states above 
or near the line are new (or newish) member states – the post-communist countries, but also 
Spain, Portugal, Finland, Cyprus – as well as Italy with its newish party system largely created 
around the time of communist breakdown in Eastern Europe. However, the same does not 
apply for Sweden, Austria, or in particular Malta, which MEPs have unusually low 
parliamentary experience for such a small country.  
 
                                                     
14 However, such extrapolation carries dangers, especially as we ought to assume that the share with national 
parliamentary experience approaches 0% asymptotically but never falls below that. Such more sophisticated 
model is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
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Figure 5 Number of MEPs and MEPs' experience of national parliament 
 
Note: Hollow triangle is an anchor point (see text). Source: see Figure 4. 
 
The empirical relationship between the number of MEPs and their national ministerial 
experience is nearly as strong as the (logged) number of MEPs explains 33% of the variation 
in experience (see Figure 6).15 Again, the MEPs from post-communist member states carry 
more ministerial experience (some 20 percentage points higher on average). Unsurprisingly, 
the overall level of previous ministerial experience is lower than national parliamentary 
experience – the number of cabinet positions is more limited both in terms of available seats 
and in terms of parties that win seats in national parliament yet have seldom or never been 
in government (see below).  
 
                                                     
15 We have not used constrained regression here as it is difficult to determine the anchor point. A similar logic 
as used under parliamentary experience ought to apply but forcing the regression through the same anchor 
point would fit the empirical data very poorly. The intercept for (non-constrained) linear regression is at 68% 
only. A more advanced theoretical model should also take into account the actual size of cabinets or parliaments 
– these are correlated to country size (and the number of MEPs) but there is significant variation at similar 
country sizes (see Figure 2 and Figure 2Figure 3 above). 
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Figure 6 Number of MEPs and MEPs' national ministerial experience 
 
 
It is easy to see why MEPs from small member states could be relatively experienced. Even 
though cabinets tend to be smaller in small member states, they are bigger relative to the 
number of MEPs. For example, Luxembourg has 2.5 cabinet members per MEP while, at the 
other end of spectrum, Germany has more than six MEPs per cabinet member. In other words, 
that increases the probability of any MEP having sat in the national cabinet.  
 
This effect is amplified in countries where governments change more often, as it gives more 
politicians a chance to serve in the cabinet. Notably the Baltic states – as nearly all small 
member states – tend to have relatively short-lived cabinets. 16  However, several large 
member states have also had rather short-lived cabinets – such as France, Romania, Poland 
and, most notoriously Italy, that may explain the relatively high levels of experience given the 
size of EP representation. The combination of large cabinets with high cabinet turnover (i.e. 
low duration) particularly gives even more politicians a chance to serve as ministers.17  
 
Another important intervening variable is the presence or absence of parties permanently 
excluded from national governments – some of which may be particularly or even only 
successful in European elections – such as the Danish June Movement that was represented 
in the EP until 2009 or UKIP that had had a sizeable representation in EP since 2004, yet did 
not win representation in the national parliament until 2014. Furthermore, the success of 
parties that have failed to enter national government further contributes to the low levels of 
ministerial experience among MEPs (most notably the French Front National or Danish 
People’s Party). Among the Baltic MEPs, those from Latvia and Lithuania have high levels of 
ministerial experience. The countries combine medium-sized cabinets with very high levels of 
                                                     
16 Luxembourg is an exception, the mean cabinet duration has also been slightly above the EU average in Ireland, 
Denmark and Finland (see Andersson et al. 2014). 
17 Further evidence on the combined effect of cabinet size and duration available on request. 
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cabinet turnover – hence, the levels of ministerial experience are not surprising, especially as 
the governments in these countries have been rather inclusive of most major parties (with 
the exception of the predominantly Russophone Harmony Centre). 
 
Additional potential explanations of higher levels of national political experience among MEPs 
from smaller and, in particular, newer member states include the typical length of political 
career paths, electoral systems and factors particular to new member states, principally post-
communist countries. 
MEPs from smaller member states can also have more national political experience because 
of more limited political career opportunities on a national level. These tend to be more 
limited in smaller countries as the potential career ladder in national politics is shorter. People 
can become ministers at a lower age18, as the ladder from junior political roles to the apex of 
national government is shorter due to less complex political hierarchy with fewer levels. Note 
that the argument here is close to the proposed tentative theoretical model for national 
parliamentary experience presented above.19 
 
In theory, electoral systems might also affect the levels of national political experience among 
MEPs. In particular, we could speculate that the presence of preference voting may raise the 
profile of MEPs by giving an advantage to candidates tried and tested in national politics. 
Preference voting is used in all three Baltic states20 and may explain the particularly high levels 
of experience among Baltic MEPs. The absence of preference voting may explain the low 
levels of national experience in some of the member states (UK, France, Germany and Greece) 
and low levels for post-communist countries (Romania, Hungary).21  However, some countries 
with closed lists (Portugal and Spain) have fairly high levels of national political experience. 
Closed lists can, in principle, either allow the parties to enlist lesser known candidates or lead 
to stronger control over who can become an MEP, protecting the party elites against internal 
challengers.  
 
                                                     
18 There is evidence that average age of ministers in democracies is positively correlated to country size and was 
particularly low in Estonia and Latvia (44.6 and 43.6, respectively, in 1999-2012). More detail is available on 
request from authors.  
19 Interestingly, extrapolating the empirical fits leads to intuitively sensible model predictions for hypothetical 
nano-countries. A society of 92 would have a cabinet with a single member on average (societies significantly 
smaller than that would lack formal institutions altogether). That is a reasonable expectation considering the 
nature of socio-political organization.  The average age of ministers in such a country would be 36.6. That is, 
again, a rather reasonable expectation for a sole leader, on average. Note that we are assuming democracy – 
otherwise the person may hold on to power and the mean age would increase significantly. 
20 The 2009 election in Estonia was an exception that may partly explain the relatively lower levels of experience 
there. The levels are lower than those in Latvia and Lithuania even when discounting the independent Indrek 
Tarand whose campaign strongly attacked the adoption of closed party lists (that were scrapped soon after the 
election). 
21 Data on electoral systems from Corbett et al. 2011, pp.17–18. 
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The higher levels of experience among MEPs from post-communist countries (and other 
relatively new member states) may also be explained by the fact that the accession only took 
place recently and lower living standards in the countries. For political elites of new member 
states it was impossible to build up their careers focussing on the European level from early 
on and all aspiring politicians had to focus entirely on careers in national political institutions. 
Finally, service at the EP can be more coveted for politicians from new member states because 
the remuneration (including expenses) is better compared to national salaries for MPs or 
ministers. That may, yet again, lead to top spots on electoral lists being reserved for senior 
ranks within political parties. 
Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the political mechanics of county size by looking at the patterns of 
representation in the European Parliament and national political experience of MEPs. We 
found that the potential influence of Baltic MEPs in the European parliament is severely 
constrained by low numbers. It can also contribute to the separation of mainstream domestic 
politics and European issues (see Sikk 2009a) as MEPs are bound to  remain a small minority 
among the leadership of national parties – an effect amplified by high party system 
fragmentation.  
 
Furthermore, given the small number of MEPs from all three Baltic countries, the countries 
are unlikely to be represented in all EP committees. It can be argued that national expertise 
on certain European policy fields would suffer as a consequence even if the MEPs 
enthusiastically interacted across party and country lines. However, cooperation is scarce, 
often even between MEPs belonging to the same EP party group. Less pessimistically, the 
MEPs from the Baltic states have been prioritizing issue areas that are perceived to be 
particularly relevant or where they see an important role for EP (a strategy for countries to 
overcome their smallness mentioned by Panke in this volume). This mostly applies for 
external affairs, as the Foreign Affairs committee has constantly seen a steady representation 
of Baltic MEPs. Additionally, Lithuanian MEPs have been focussed on energy policies, 
explained by particular issues in the country.  
 
However, we also show that the small numbers are partly compensated by the relatively high 
profile of Baltic MEPs, indicated by high levels of national political experience (as ministers 
and MPs) and leadership roles within national parties. We argue that there is a general 
negative correlation between such expertise and country size, further amplified in new 
member states that, that has led to very high levels of national political experience among 
the Baltic MEPs. Particularly the MEPs who have previously served as ministers have high 
levels of expertise on European policies and on executive-legislative interactions, acquired 
while negotiating between the European Union institutions as well as nationally between the 
executive and legislative institutions. Overall, the combination of higher than average 
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expertise and prioritization help top alleviate the problems resulting from small numbers and 
problems of coordination between Baltic MEPs. 
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